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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the court of appeals, in the course of affirming 
the summary judgment in favor of Grand County, failed to consider 
the genuine issues of disputed material fact concerning equitable 
estoppel. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 
P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Utah 
6 
State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light, 776 P.2d 
632, 634 (Utah 1989); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 
648, 649 (Utah 1986)). On certiorari, this Court does not review 
the decision of the trial court but rather that of the court of 
appeals, which this Court reviews for correction of error. Harper 
v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10 f 10 (citing State ex rel. M.W. and 
S.W., 2000 UT 79, f8, 12 P.3d 80, 82); see also Landes, 795 P.2d 
at 1129 (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P. 2d 245, 247 (Utah 
1988) ) . 
2. Whether the court of appeals failed to consider the 
property owners of the subject parcels of property in the instant 
case to be necessary parties that should be joined as parties to 
the action prior to a full and fair determination of the matters 
at issue. The court of appeals7 interpretation of Utah R. Civ. P. 
19 is accorded no particular deference and is reviewed for 
correctness. Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P. 2d 1127, 1129 
(Utah 1990) (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 
1988)). 
3. Whether the court of appeals erred in its interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1, et seq. , and failed to consider the 
genuine issues of material fact of whether the absent third-party 
property owners qualify as occupying claimants pursuant to the 
statute. The court of appeals7 statutory interpretation is 
7 
accorded no particular deference and is reviewed for correctness. 
Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) 
(citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
and regulations, whose interpretation is determinative in the 
instant appeal, are set out verbatim, with the appropriate 
citation, in the body and arguments of the instant brief. 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
This case arises out of the court of appeals' affirmance of 
the district court's summary judgment in favor of Grand County, 
the substance of which involves issues concerning necessary and 
indispensable third parties not before the court, substantial 
issues of material fact concerning equitable estoppel, and 
material issues of fact concerning the statutory interpretation of 
whether the property owners are occupying claimants pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1 et seg. Grand County initiated this 
action against Mr. Lester W. Rogers, solely, alleging that Mr. 
Rogers had failed to properly subdivide various parcels of 
property located in Grand County prior to selling the same. Grand 
County, among other things, prayed for (1) an order enjoining Mr. 
Rogers from further subdividing the subject property and from 
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selling any part of the entire parcel during the pendency of the 
lawsuit, and (2) an order requiring Mr. Rogers to conform the 
already conveyed parcels of property with the applicable zoning 
and subdivision ordinances. Mr. Rogers responded to Grand 
County's Complaint by denying the allegations in the Complaint and 
cross-claiming against various doe parties that occupied the 
parcels of property after having purchased the parcels from Mr. 
Rogers. By way of his Cross-Claim, Mr. Rogers sought judicial 
partition of the property previously sold to the third parties. 
Grand County shortly thereafter filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Mr. Rogers responded by filing a Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, together with the Affidavit of Lester Rogers, in which 
he raised various genuine issues of material fact. In addition, 
Mr. Rogers, through his counsel, requested oral argument on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The district court, without oral argument, granted summary 
judgment by way of its Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Thereafter, the district court signed its Judgment (Enjoining 
Violation of Subdivision Ordinance). Mr. Rogers, through counsel, 
filed Notice of Appeal. This Court transferred the instant appeal 
to the Utah Court of Appeals on December 27, 1999. 
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On June 2, 2000, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an 
unpublished Memorandum Decision, in which it affirmed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Grand County. See 
Grand County v. Rogers, 2000 UT App 162, a true and correct copy 
of which is attached hereto as Addenda D. Mr. Rogers filed a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which this Court granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The instant case arose some time after Mr. Rogers sold 
parcels of his property to various individuals not before the 
Court. The parcels of property sold by Mr. Rogers are located in 
Thompson, Utah, which is situated in the outermost part of Grand 
County. 
2. The conveyances of the parcels of property were accepted 
and recorded by the Grand County Recorder's Office (R. 18-21, 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, Warranty Deed, and Vacant Land Sales 
Contracts attached to the Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
3. Subsequent to the aforementioned sales, the various 
third-party property owners obtained building permits and 
extensively improved their parcels of property. 
4. Some five years after the sale of the first parcel of 
property by Mr. Rogers, Grand County filed a Complaint against Mr. 
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Rogers, alleging that he had failed to properly subdivide the lots 
prior to selling the same to the various third parties (R. 1-4, 
Complaint). 
5. In its Complaint, Grand County, among other things, 
prayed for an order requiring Mr. Rogers to conform the already 
sold parcels of property with the applicable zoning and 
subdivision ordinances (R. 3, Complaint). 
6. Mr. Rogers answered the Complaint, raising numerous 
affirmative defenses, which included estoppel and waiver (R. 7-
14, Answer and Cross Claim, pp. 2-4) . In addition, Mr. Rogers 
cross-claimed against various doe parties, alleging, among other 
things, that the property should be partitioned inasmuch as 
various third parties possessed the subject property under color 
of title as occupying claimants pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-
4 (See id. at R. 11-12, pp. 5-6). 
7. Shortly after the aforementioned pleadings were filed, 
Grand County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Mr. Rogers 
responded in opposition by filing a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities, supported by the Affidavit of Lester Rogers in which 
Mr. Rogers argued that various genuine issues of material fact, 
which included estoppel, partition, and the failure to join 
indispensable parties, precluded summary judgment (See R. 29-39, 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
11 
Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 3 6-39, Affidavit of Lester 
Rogers). Mr. Rogers requested oral argument on the motion for 
summary j udgment. 
8. Without oral argument, the district court ruled that 
Grand County was "clearly entitled to an injunction . . .", and 
that Mr. Rogers "has not raised any genuine issue of material fact 
to preclude granting the relief." (See R. 59-62, Ruling on Motion 
for Summary Judgment, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addenda A ) . 
9. Shortly thereafter, the district court signed the 
Judgment (Enjoining Violation of Subdivision Ordinance), ordering 
Mr. Rogers "to properly apply for and obtain subdivision approval 
as to those parcels, which he has already subdivided and/or sold 
contrary to law." (See R. 63-66, Judgment (Enjoining Violation of 
Subdivision Ordinance), a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Addenda B). 
10. Mr. Rogers, through counsel, filed Notice of Appeal (See 
R. 67-70, Notice of Appeal) . 
11. On June 2, 2 000, the court of appeals issued an 
unpublished Memorandum Decision, in which it affirmed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Grand County. See 
Grand County v. Rogers, 2000 UT App 162, a true and correct copy 
of which is attached hereto as Addenda D. 
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12. Mr. Rogers filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
which this Court granted (See Order granting Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addenda E). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
1. The equitable doctrine of estoppel requires proof of 
three elements, which are (i) a statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later 
asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other party; 
and (iii) injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act. In this case, the 
Grand County Recorder accepted and recorded each document utilized 
to memorialize the sale and conveyance of properties by Mr. Rogers 
to various third parties. Grand County acknowledges accepting and 
recording the previously mentioned documents. By accepting and 
recording those instruments, Grand County performed acts that are 
inconsistent with its subsequent enforcement of the subdivision 
ordinance. 
In its unpublished decision, the court of appeals held that 
11
 the recording of the relevant instruments is for notice purposes 
and is unrelated to the County's enforcement of zoning ordinances 
13 
. . . ." The court's legal conclusion is in direct contravention 
to the County Recorder's statutory duty to index deeds and other 
instruments "partitioning or affecting the title to or possession 
of real property" as well as the grantors and grantees of such as 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6 (1) (b) & (c) (1995). 
Moreover, the County Recorder is required by Utah Code Ann. § 17-
21-22 (1995) to report changes in ownership "where only a part of 
the grantor's property is currently conveyed" and then "transmit 
an additional form showing a full legal description of the portion 
retained." 
In addition to the acceptance and recording of instruments, 
the parties, to whom Mr. Rogers sold and conveyed the subject 
properties, possessed and made extensive valuable improvements to 
their individual parcels of property. At oral argument before the 
court of appeals, Grand County essentially acknowledged that the 
building permits issued to the buyers of Mr. Rogers' property 
obtained building permits, which allegedly were mistakenly issued 
by Grand County. The application of equitable estoppel to the 
instant case is particularly appropriate inasmuch as Grand County 
waited over five years after the sale of the first parcel of 
property by Mr. Rogers to Ms. Betty L. Relitz and almost a year 
and a half after the last sale to file a Complaint against Mr. 
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Rogers, alleging that he had failed to properly subdivide the 
subject property prior to selling the same to third parties. 
The court of appeals failed to consider the disputed material 
facts that the subject parcels of property had been extensively 
improved or that Grand County had substantially delayed its 
enforcement of the subdivision ordinance. Moreover, the court of 
appeals' legal conclusion that Grand County was not estopped is in 
direct conflict with this Court's decision in Young where this 
Court stated that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies "when 
a county committed an act or omission upon which the developer 
could rely in good faith in making substantial changes in position 
or incurring extensive expenses." Further, the court of appeals 
failed to consider that the disputed material facts in the instant 
case constitute "something beyond mere ownership of land . . . ." 
When properly considered, these disputed material facts constitute 
the exceptional circumstances contemplated for the application of 
estoppel against Grand County. 
2. The court of appeals' decision evinces the failure to 
consider the arguments set forth in the Brief of Appellant 
squarely before the court, where Mr. Rogers argued that according 
to Rule 19(a)(1), the property owners to whom Mr. Rogers sold 
parcels of the subject property are necessary parties to the 
litigation because in their absence complete relief cannot be 
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accorded among those already parties. From 1994 through 1997, Mr. 
Rogers sold and conveyed various parcels of the subject property 
to bona fide third parties. By virtue of the claims asserted by 
Grand County, the interests of the third party property owners who 
are not parties u^ uhi& action are directly adverse to the 
interests asserted by Grand ^ounty inasmuch as Grand County, by 
wa) of th :i o < < no< : J
 L< »w o c :< zr i :: enfc i: ce the reqi ] i r ements :: f the 
subdivi s ion ordinance propert ies owned by the thi rd - party 
property o\ ; i leu s I s Cc \ i: ip] c s 
Action for u:r:.T.i: J u d g m e n t d e m o n s t r a t e ;•:,/•; ne c e s s a r y the third-
Complaint and Motion, Grand County asserted that Mr. Rogers' sales 
and conveyances of the subject parcels of property are void. 
In addition to the arguments under subsection (1) , the absent 
property owners are necessary parties under subsection (2) 
inasmuch as they have an interest relating to the subject property 
and are so situated that the disposition,,, of the action i n their 
absence may impair oi impede their ability to protect that 
interest. For example, the district court's judgment constitutes 
a j udgment ilen upon une r-:.! - • • : ;;:i! tl n is e n c i iiiibei: , i n„„g 
the mtere:"',v ~.r r "• /hsent tnirci party property owners and 
there:-
subdivision ordinance requirements upon the third-party property 
owners without any response or opposition to the enforcement. 
The court of appeals also failed to consider that the 
district court's present disposition may subject Mr. Rogers to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations in order to comply with the district 
court's ruling as it is presently fashioned. Even if Mr. Rogers 
could legally comply with the district court's order, such 
compliance would subject Mr. Rogers to multiple obligations that 
would likely be incurred by actions filed by the absent third-
party property owners against Mr. Rogers to defend their interests 
or otherwise shift responsibility for assessments incurred by the 
subdivision ordinance requirements. 
Without little or no consideration of the joinder issue, the 
court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment, in which the 
district court ordered Mr. Rogers to apply and obtain subdivision 
approval for the parcels of property already sold to third parties 
not before the court. The district court ordered Mr. Rogers' 
compliance notwithstanding that he does not have the legal 
capacity or right to bring the previously sold and conveyed 
parcels of property into compliance with the applicable zoning and 
subdivision ordinances because ownership of the parcels, whether 
deemed legal or equitable, now lies with absent third parties. 
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In tliu course of concluding that the buyers to whoi n Mr. 
Rogers sold parcels of property are not necessary parties under 
Rule 19 f the court of appeals failed to consider the two general 
factors in Utah R. Ci v. P. 19(a). By so doing, the court of 
appeals ignored this court's decision in B0nnevuie Tower, in 
which this Court held that the "failure to bring all parties 
before the roi u: t prev ei its :i 1: fi : c n: i pi op< : 
plaintiff's claim," Finally, the court of appeals' :ecis.on 
con f] :i cts ; :i tl 1 tl :i :i s Coi 11: t: s deci s:i 01 :i :i i i S t : J i< a \ ' Sa It 
11 Utah 2d 196, 356" P. 2d S'M
 t 637 (.196M), where this Court held 
11
 cj r a n t ; e e o i "i d e e i I.1. , i In >/d.l i d i i } I 'I'I'II i i 11 i ' uiidi i J I I at ik ' i < > b e 
necessary parties. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. IN THE COURSE OF AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF GRAND COUNTY, THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED 
TO CONSIDER THE GENUINE ISSUES OF DISPUTED 
MATERIAL FACT. 
A. Summary Judgment Principles 
n
 'Summary ji ldgment i s appr opi: i ate oi :i 1 y v 1 lei I nc gei n :i li i le :i ssi ie 
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as c •.* 4 - .'.'" • :^ 
4.96, 497 ( U t a h ±9^b> i q u e u i n g Higginx - • : La<~- ' z:, *y 55 
18 
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c);1. "The party 
moving for summary judgment must establish a right to judgment 
based on the applicable law as applied to an undisputed material 
issue of fact." Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 
(Utah 1993). "'[I]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [the 
appellate court] view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, '" which in this case is Mr. Rogers, the Petitioner. K & T, 
Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994) (quoting Higgins, 
855 P,2d at 233); see also Parker, 971 P.2d at 496-97. 
The determination of whether a party is entitled to summary 
judgment is a question of law, and therefore, this Court accords 
no deference to the court of appeals' resolution of the legal 
issues presented. Parker, 971 P. 2d at 497; Higgins, 855 P. 2d at 
235; Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) . In reviewing 
the court of appeals' determination as to summary judgment, this 
Court determines only whether the court of appeals "erred in 
applying the governing law" and whether the court "correctly held 
xRule 56(c) provides in relevant part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
19 
that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Ferree, 784 
P. 2d at 15] (citing Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. \ r Nielson, 672 
p > 2d 746, 749 (Utah 1983)); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 
436 (Utah 1982) ) . 
B. Genuine issues o- disputed material fact 
exist as to whether Grand County is estopped 
from enforcing its subdivision ordinance. 
The equitable doctrine of estoppel requires proof of three 
elements. Those three elements are "(i) a statement; admission, 
a f < :ii i I c o n s :i s t e n t: ; i :i t h a :: 1 a :i i i: i 
later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other 
p ,; ' (:i :ii ii ) :ii i l j i n : y t : 11: le s econd p a:i : t; * / oi lII :ll i : € si i] t f :i : : i i: i 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate si ich 
s .. -1 - .. . , a ::t • :: r fa :i ] i ii e t :: act I J ui i lej ; l/i estates 
Casing' Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, 113 4
 # 989 P.2d 1077 (citing CECO 
Corp, v. Concrete Specialists, Inc.. " * h^ 
1989) ) . 
In Utah County v Young, 61 5 P. 2d 1265 (I Jtah 1980), the Utah. 
Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
applies "when a county committed an act or omission upon which the 
developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes 
in position or incurring extensive expenses." Id. r.*- ']?c.ri - citing 
Pasco county v. Tampa Dev. " - ? r . ~*r % "n ?'i "'
 L a . L L . A p p . 
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1978)); accord Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 803 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). In short, u[e]stoppel, waiver or laches 
ordinarily do not constitute a defense to a suit for injunctive 
relief against alleged violations" asserted by a county "unless 
the circumstances are exceptional." Salt Lake County v. 
Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1976). To constitute 
exceptional circumstances, "something beyond mere ownership of 
land is required." Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283, 290 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah 
1981); Young, 615 P.2d at 1267; Kartchner, 552 P.2d at 138-39; 
Town of Alta, 836 P.2d at 802-03. Moreover, mere u [s]ilence or 
inaction will not operate to work an estoppel." Young, 615 P.2d 
at 1268. 
A determination concerning estoppel involves material 
questions of fact that preclude summary judgment, especially when 
the parties dispute facts material to whether estoppel applies. 
See van der Heyde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 845 P.2d 275, 280 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Moreover, a determination of whether 
estoppel applies to a particular set of facts requires the fact 
finder to consider testimony and therefore make credibility 
determinations about such testimony as it pertains to the elements 
of estoppel. Id. ; see generally Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 
2d 292, 294, 431 P.2d 126, 128 (1967); Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 
21 
1291, 1292 (Utah 1978) (stating that even in cases where facts are 
m.iL in "c<.. .. ..ete conflict" but the "understanding, intention, and 
consequences" of the facts are disputed, the matters '"can only be 
resolved by a trial"). 
in che case at bar, cue Grand County Recorder a'r^r.'- I 
recorded each document vitalized to memorialize the sale -.ind 
conveyance or p ; ••• •—; 
(See ^ . 36-39, Affidavit: * tester Rogers, %9) Irarra l"ou;:ty 
documents Affidavi* of the Grand County Zoning 
I.: . . -: ! i 11ni I L""'DiiiiLy lIle - in support 
of ILLS Motion for Summary Judgment (See R. 15-17, Affidavit of 
M a i y I I o £ 1 I i i i e i n Support of Plaintiff's Motion for S umma r y 
Judgment, ff2-4) . By accepting and recording those instruments, 
Grand County performed acts that are inconsistent wi th i ts 
subsequent enforcement of the subdivision ordinance. 
See Uniform Real Estate Contract attached to the 
Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; R. 18.5, Warranty Deed attached to the Affidavit of 
Mary Hofhine in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
R. 18, Vacant Land Sales Contract attached to the Affidavit of Mary 
Hofhine in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 21, 
Vacant Land Sales Contract attached to the Affidavit of Mary Hofhine 
i II Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; and R, 20, 
Vacant Land Sales Contract attached to the Affidavit of Mary Hofhine 
i n Support, of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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In its unpublished decision, the court of appeals held that 
"the recording of the relevant instruments is for notice purposes 
and is unrelated to the County's enforcement of zoning ordinances 
. . . ." See Grand County v. Rogers, 2000 UT App 162, pp. 1-2. 
This legal conclusion by the court of appeals is in direct 
contravention to the County Recorder's statutory duty to index 
deeds and other instruments "partitioning or affecting the title 
to or possession of real property" as well as the grantors and 
grantees of such as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6(1) (b) & 
(c) (1995). Moreover, the County Recorder is required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-21-22 (1995) to report changes in ownership "where 
only a part of the grantor's property is currently conveyed" and 
then "transmit an additional form showing a full legal description 
of the portion retained." 
In addition to the acceptance and recording of instruments, 
the parties, to whom Mr. Rogers sold and conveyed the subject 
properties, possessed and made extensive valuable improvements to 
their individual parcels of property (See R. 3 6-39, Affidavit of 
Lester Rogers, flO) . At oral argument before the court of 
appeals, Grand County essentially acknowledged that the building 
permits issued to the buyers of Mr. Rogers' property obtained 
building permits, which allegedly were mistakenly issued by Grand 
County. The application of equitable estoppel to the instant case 
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is particularly appropriate inasmuch as Grand County waited over 
five years after the sale of the first parcel of property by Mr. 
Rogers to Ms. Betty L. Relitz and almost a year and a half after 
the last sale to file a Complaint against Mr. Rogers, alleging 
that he nau iailed iu propc ~ y
 SUIJCilv:[(je the subject r;r~r-- --fy 
prior to Telling the same third parties ' See •, 
Cornpl a i i u 
Nowhere in its unpublished decision did the c: ,*rt of appeals 
• z o n s :i de i: 11 ie _ a t e i i a ] f a < : : 
property had been extensively improved or that Grand County had 
.i.(- .-.-_. i - iti/:: .".s enforcemei it : f the subd i /i si on 
ordinance. The CCUIL of appeals' legal conclusion that Grand 
County was not estopped is in direct conflict with this Court's 
decision in Young where this Court stated that the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel applies "when a county committed an act or 
omission upon which the developer could rely in good faith in 
making substant ia1 changes i n position or incurring extensive 
expenses . " Utah Cox iiifi] 3 r< : >i i z igf 62 5 I • 2d : il 1 2 6' ] (c i 1 : i i lg Pa sec :> 
County v. Tampa Dev, Corp., 364 S.2d 850 (FJ a. Ct App 1978)), 
Fi lr ther, the cc i i:i : !:  : f appea] s fai] ed tc :::oris:i der that tl ie 5 i spi ited 
material facts . , .-• instant case constitute '"something beyond 
me' r e c >wiie •• * "d . . . . " Sti z : " kt 8 ; 0 I 2 1 it 2 90 \ 71 .en 
properly considered, these disputed material facts constitute the 
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exceptional circumstances contemplated for the application of 
estoppel against Grand County. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 
PROPERTY OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF PROPERTY 
TO BE NECESSARY PARTIES THAT SHOULD BE JOINED 
PRIOR TO A FULL AND FAIR DETERMINATION OF THE 
MATTERS AT 
ISSUE. 
xxTo determine if a party is necessary, a court should 
consider the two general factors in rule 19(a)" of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure.3 Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 
1130 (Utah 1990) . According to the first factor, a party is 
necessary if uin his absence complete relief cannot be accorded 
among those already parties." See Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). 
Under the second factor, a party is necessary if 
he [or she] claims an interest relating to 
the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his [or 
her] absence may (i) as practical matter 
impair or impede his [or her] ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of 
the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of his claimed 
interest. 
3In Cassidy v. Salt Lake Fire Civil Serv. Council, 97'6 P. 2d 607 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999), the court of appeals recently stated that "a 
party may raise the issue of failure to join an indispensable party 
at any time in the proceedings, including for the first time on 
appeal." Id. at 610 (citing Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 
941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd sub nom., Landes v. Capital City 
Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990)). 
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See Utah R. Crv £'. 19(a)(2). If the court determines that the 
party i s necessary according to the aforementioned criteria, Rule 
19 mandates that the party "shall be joined."4 
"The basic purpose of rule 19 is 'to protect the interest of 
absent persons as wen db Liiose a' - TI 
multiple litigatior r .: iconsisten- • udicial determinations. ' " 
[sat h'r • ; . , 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure. *i^ii '? - 16 .;-. a- 21 
\e xuise Dt performing i\ :?ule 1J a:ialys„, °^ :.e JQJ-.L should 
- :- . - r4 -_ :, . reasonina i-hat lead t-o *-^P conclusion 
that a party is L^ *« .x^ ^ necessary under rule 19 (a) or 
4Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), which addresses 
indispensable parties, provides: 
If a person as described in Subdivision (a)(1)-
(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good 
conscience the action should proceed among the 
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the 
absent person being thus regarded as 
indispensable. The factors to be considered by 
the court include: first, to what extent a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence might 
be prejudicial to him [or her] or those already 
parties; second, the extent to which, by 
protective provisions in the judgment, by the 
shaping of relief, or other measure, the 
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, 
whether a judgment rendered in the person's 
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the 
plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the 
action is dismissed for nonjoinder, 
indispensable under rule 19(b)." Landes, 795 P.2d at 1130 (citing 
Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1977)). 
In its unpublished decision, the court of appeals stated that 
"Rogers has not argued that subsection (1) [of Utah R. Civ. 19] 
applies and, under subsection (2), Rogers's buyers are not 
necessary parties." For the reasons set forth below, the court of 
appeals failed to consider Mr. Rogers7 arguments pursuant to 
subsection (1) and erroneously concluded that the third-party 
buyers are not necessary parties under subsection (2). 
First, the factors set out in subsections (1) and (2) of Rule 
19(a) are disjunctive. Notwithstanding, the court of appeals' 
decision evinces its failure to consider the arguments set forth 
at pages 26-27 of the Brief of Appellant, where Mr. Rogers argued 
that according to Rule 19(a) (1), the property owners to whom Mr. 
Rogers sold parcels of the subject property are necessary parties 
to the litigation because in their absence complete relief cannot 
be accorded among those already parties. Cf. Stone v. Salt Lake 
City, 11 Utah 2d 196, 356 P.2d 631, 637 (1960) (holding "grantees 
of deeds, the validity of which is under attack" to be necessary 
parties). From 1994 through 1997, Mr. Rogers sold and conveyed 
various parcels of the subject property to bona fide third parties 
(See R. 15-17, Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, fH2-5; R- 36-39; Affidavit of Lester 
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Rogers, ff8-10) .5 By virtue of the claims asserted by Grand 
County, the interests of the third party property owners who are 
not parties to this action are directly adverse to the interests 
asserted by Grand County inasmuch as Grand County, by way of this 
case, now seeks to enforce the requirements of the subdivision 
ordinance on properties owned by the third party property owners. 
Moreover, both Grand County's Complaint and its Motion for Summary 
Judgment demonstrate how necessary the third-party property owners 
are to the instant litigation. In its Complaint and Motion, Grand 
County asserted that Mr. Rogers' sales and conveyances of the 
subject parcels of property are void (See R. 3, Complaint, %2 of 
the Prayer; R. 27-28, Amended Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 41, Plaintiff's 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment). 
In addition to the arguments under subsection (1), the absent 
property owners are necessary parties under subsection (2) 
inasmuch as they have an interest relating to the subject property 
and are so situated that the disposition of the action in their 
5The record reveals that Grand County failed to challenge or 
contradict the fact that Mr. Rogers sold the parcels of properties to 
various third parties not parties to the action. Rather, Grand 
County acknowledged the sales in the memorandum filed in support of 
its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 15-17, Affidavit of Mary Hofhine 
in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, KU2-5; R. 36-
29) . Consequently, this fact became an uncontested fact for purposes 
of summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
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absence may impair or impede their ability to protect that 
interest.6 See Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2); see also Bonneville 
Tower Condominium Management Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assocs., 
Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986) ("A plaintiff may not obtain 
relief adverse to the property rights of others who are not 
adverse parties to the case without bringing them before the 
court.") . For example, the district court's judgment constitutes 
a judgment lien upon the subject real property, thus encumbering 
the interests of the absent third-party property owners and 
thereby serving as the basis of enforcement of the various 
subdivision ordinance requirements upon the third-party property 
owners without any response or opposition to the enforcement. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (Supp. 1999). 
The court of appeals also failed to consider that the 
district court's present disposition may subject Mr. Rogers to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations in order to comply with the district 
court's ruling as it is presently fashioned. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
19(a)(2). Even if Mr. Rogers could legally comply with the 
district court's order, such compliance would subject Mr. Rogers 
6By virtue of the sales and conveyances by Mr. Rogers, the absent 
third-party property owners have an interest in the subject real 
property (R. 15-17, Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ff2-5; R. 36-39, Affidavit 
of Lester Rogers, 1M[8-10) • 
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to multiple obligations that would likely be incurred by actions 
filed by the absent third-party property owners against Mr. Rogers 
to defend their interests or otherwise shift responsibility for 
assessments incurred by the subdivision ordinance requirements. 
Without little or no consideration of the joinder issue, the 
court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment, in which the 
district court ordered Mr. Rogers to apply and obtain subdivision 
approval for the parcels of property already sold to third parties 
not before the court (See R. 64, Judgment (Enjoining Violation of 
Subdivision Ordinance)). The district court ordered Mr. Rogers' 
compliance notwithstanding that he does not have the legal 
capacity or right to bring the previously sold and conveyed 
parcels of property into compliance with the applicable zoning and 
subdivision ordinances because ownership of the parcels, whether 
deemed legal or equitable, now lies with absent third parties. 
In the course of concluding that the buyers to whom Mr. 
Rogers sold parcels of property are not necessary parties under 
Rule 19, the court of appeals failed to consider the two general 
factors in Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). See Landes, 795 P.2d at 1130. 
The court of appeals also ignored this Court's decision in 
Bonneville Tower, in which this Court held that the "failure to 
bring all parties before the court prevents it from properly 
reaching the merits of plaintiff's claim." Bonneville Tower, 728 
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P.2d at 1020. Finally, the court of appeals' decision conflicts 
with this Court's decision in Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2d 
196, 356 P.2d 631 (1960), where this Court held "grantees of 
deeds, the validity of which is under attack" to be necessary 
parties. Stone, 356 P.2d at 637. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-6-1, et seq., AND FAILED TO 
CONSIDER THE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT OF 
WHETHER THE ABSENT THIRD-PARTY PROPERTY OWNERS 
QUALIFY AS OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4(2) (a) (Supp. 2000)7 provides the 
following: 
Any person has color of title who has 
occupied a tract of real estate by himself 
[or herself] , or by those under whom he [or 
she] claims, for the term of five years, or 
who has occupied it for less time, if he [of 
she] , or those under whom he [of she] claims, 
have at any time during the occupancy with 
the knowledge or consent, express or implied, 
of the real owner made any valuable 
improvements on the real estate, or if he [or 
she] or those under whom he [or she] claims 
have at any time during the occupancy paid 
the ordinary county taxes on the real estate 
for any one year, and two years have elapsed 
without a repayment by the owner, and the 
occupancy is continued up to the time at 
which the action is brought by which the 
recovery of the real estate is obtained. 
7A copy of Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4(2) (a) (Supp. 2000) is attached 
hereto as Addenda C. 
31 
(Bracketed material added). The record on appeal reveals that the 
absent third-party property owners, to whom Mr. Rogers sold the 
subject parcels of property, have occupied the subject real 
property and have made valuable improvements to their respective 
parcels (See R. 36-39, Affidavit of Lester Rogers, %%6, 8, and 
10). In fact, at oral argument before the court of appeals, Grand 
County acknowledged the improvements to the subject property in 
the course of discussing building permits that had been issued to 
the property owners. 
Notwithstanding the previously stated plain language of the 
statute, the court of appeals held that Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1 
through 8 (1994 & Supp. 2000) did not apply to the instant case. 
See Grand County v. Rogers, 2000 UT App 162, pp. 2-3. In the 
course of its interpretation, the court of appeals stated that 
Mt]he remedy sought by the County seeks neither to expel them nor 
to encumber their property in any way." See id. 
The court of appeals failed to consider both the plain 
language of the statute and the genuine issues of disputed 
material facts under which the absent third-party property owners 
and Mr. Rogers occupy the subject property and thereby have color 
of title as against Grand County. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4 
(Supp. 2 000) . Moreover, genuine issues of material fact exist 
concerning the interest and remedies that the property owners are 
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entitled to in light of the competing interests alleged by Grand 
County in this action and whether the zoning and subdivision 
ordinances of the County take precedence over the interests 
provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1, et seq. (1994 & Supp. 
2000). See Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-3 (1994) (providing remedy for 
parties to hold property as tenants in common).8 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Rogers respectfully asks that 
this Court reverse the court of appeals unpublished decision, 
affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Grand County and remand the case for trial on the existing 
genuine issues of disputed material fact and for any other relief 
the Court deems appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of February, 2001. 
ARNOLD X WIGGINS, P.C. 
Scott—II Wiggins 
Attorneys /or Petitioner 
8A copy of Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-3 (1994) is attached hereto as 
Addenda C. 
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be mailed by First Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONER to the 
following on this 9th day of February, 2001: 
Mr. W. Scott Barrett 
Barrett & Daines 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, u£anN^4l 
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ADDENDUM 
Addenda A: Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment 
Addenda B: Judgment (Enjoining Violation of Subdivision 
Ordinance) 
Addenda C: Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-6-3 (1994) and 57-6-4 
(Supp. 2000) 
Addenda D: Unpublished Memorandum Decision of the court 
of appeals: Grand County v. Rogers, 2000 UT 
App 162 
Addenda E: Order granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
FILED JUN 2 1 1999 
THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR^RAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GRAND COUNTY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
LESTER W. ROGERS 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
Case No. 9907-38 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Plaintiff, Grand County (the "County" has moved the Court to 
issue an injunction requiring defendant Lester W. Rogers 
("Rogers") to comply with the subdivision law and prohibiting 
further subdivision of his property. Rogers has objected and the 
matter has been fully briefed and submitted for decision. 
The County is clearly entitled to an injunction against 
additional sales. The County also seeks an order that Rogers 
comply with the law as to sales already made. Rogers defends on 
the theory that the title of the purchasers cannot be affected, 
that discovery is not complete, and that there are genuine issues 
of fact. In reply, the County disclaims any intention to cloud 
the title of those purchasers. It intends only to obtain Rogers1 
compliance with the law. 
Rogers has not raised any genuine issue of material fact to 
preclude granting the relief. He has also not shown what 
1 
discovery is needed before the motion can be considered. The 
motion is therefore granted. 
Counsel for the County should submit a formal judgement 
pursuant to Rule 4-504. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 990700038 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Dated this fr^day of A r\< 
Mail MARK E. ARNOLD 
ATTORNEY 
AMERICAN PLAZA II, SUITE 404 
57 WEST 200 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841010000 
Mail W. SCOTT BARRETT 
ATTORNEY 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
FILED
 A U G - k 1999 
W. Scott Barrett (0228) CLERK OAJTHE COURT 
BARRETT & DAINES BY fa 
108 North Main, Suite 200 ' 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-4000 
Facsimile: (435) 753-4002 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
GRAND COUNTY, 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, (ENJOINING VIOLATION OF 
SUBDIVISION ORDINANCE) 
vs. 
LESTER W. ROGERS, Civil No. 9907-3i 
Defendant. Judge: Anderson 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for decision before the undersigned sitting 
without a jury on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; and 
The Court having determined that the matter has been fully briefed and submitted for 
decision and having examined the proofs of the respective parties and the written arguments 
submitted, W. Scott Barrett appearing for the Plaintiff, and Mark E. Arnold appearing as attorney 
for the Defendant; and 
The Court having issued its written ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the 21st day of June, 1999, granting the Plaintiffs Motion. 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That the Defendant and all persons acting under him be, and they hereby are, enjoined 
from further subdividing the property described in the Complaint. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant be 
required to properly apply for and obtain subdivision approval as to those parcels, which he has 
already subdivided and/or sold contrary to law. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, 
postage prepaid, this 9th day of July, 1999, to the following: 
Mark E. Arnold 
Attorney at Law 
American Plaza II, Suite 404 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Secretary 
3 
COURT CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 5™ day of AUGUST, 1999,1 mailed, postage prepaid, or 
hand delivered, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to the following: 
W. Scott Barrett 
BARRETT & DAINES 
108 North Main 
Suite 200 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Mark E. Arnold 
Attorney at Law 
57 West 200 South 
Suite 404 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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57-6-3 REAL ESTATE 
title, to recover value of his improvements to 
extent that they unjustly enrich record owner 
by enhancing value of his land. Reimann v. 
Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949). 
—Separate action. 
This section contemplates a separate action. 
American Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102 
Utah 318, 117 P.2d 293 (1941), rehearing de-
nied, 102 Utah 328, 133 P2d 332 (1943). 
Evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
The burden is on the occupying claimant to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he acted in good faith in placing the improve-
ments on the property. Erickson v. Stokes, 120 
Utah 653, 237 P.2d 1012 (1951). 
—Occupying claimants. 
Evidence sustained finding that defendants 
were not occupying claimants but were in pos-
session as result of a trust. Sorenson v. 
Korsgaard, 83 Utah 177, 27 P.2d 439 (1933). 
—Permanent improvements. 
In action to quiet title to three parcels of 
realty and to recover damages, evidence was 
insufficient to support finding that occupying 
claimants had constructed permanent improve-
ments on the land. Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah 
147, 203 R2d 387 (1949). 
—Value of improvements. 
This section recogni2es the equitable rule 
that the reasonable cost of the improvements, 
alone, is not sufficient evidence of value, but 
may be considered together with all other evi-
dence of value in determining the increase in 
value of the land on account of the improve-
ments. Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 
P.2d 387 (1949). 
Good faith. 
Occupant who placed the improvements on 
the property during the pendency of the main 
action did not act in good faith, although that 
action remained pending for three years with-
out the plaintiff's calling it up for trial, where 
there was no indication that the main action 
had been abandoned. The plaintiff's delay did 
not amount to laches barring him from assert-
ing lack of good faith against the occupant, 
because the occupant could have called the case 
up for trial himself, or could have moved to 
dismiss for lack of prosecution at any time 
during the period. Erickson v. Stokes, 120 Utah 
653, 237 P.2d 1012 (1951). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 
ments §§ 42 to 47. 
41 Am. Jur. 2d Improve- C.J.S. — 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 9. 
Key Numbers. — Improvements <*=» 4(6). 
57-6-3. Rights of parties — Acquiring other's interest or 
holding as tenants in common. 
The plaintiff in the main action may thereupon pay the appraised value of 
the improvements and take the property, but should he fail to do so after a 
reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, the defendant may take the property 
upon paying its value, exclusive of the improvements. If this is not done within 
a reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, the parties will be held to be tenants 
in common of all the real estate, including the improvements, each holding an 
interest proportionate to the values ascertained on the trial. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2023; 
C.L. 1917, § 5033; RJS. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-
6-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Equitable basis of recovery. 
Evidence. 
—Permanent improvements. 
—Value of improvements. 
Right to sale or partition of property. 
Value of improvements. 
—Fair market value. 
Equitable basis of recovery. 
This section ameliorates strict common-law 
rule that record owner is entitled to improve-
ments placed by another upon his property, and 
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OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS 57-6-4 
is based upon equitable doctrine of unjust en-
richment, which entitles bona fide claimant, 
who acted while in possession under color of 
title, to recover value of his improvements to 
extent that they unjustly enrich record owner 
by enhancing value of his land. Reimann v. 
Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949). 
Evidence. 
— Permanent improvements. 
In action to quiet title to three parcels of 
realty and to recover damages, evidence was 
insufficient to support finding that occupying 
claimants had constructed permanent improve-
ments on the land. Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah 
147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949). 
—Value of improvements. 
This section recognizes the equitable rule 
that the reasonable cost of the improvements, 
alone, is not sufficient evidence of value, but 
such cost may be considered together with all 
other evidence of value in determining the 
increase in value of the land on account of the 
improvements. Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah 
COLLATERAL 
Brigham Young Law Review. — The Law 
of Practical Location of Boundaries and the 
147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949) 
Right to sale or partition of property. 
This chapter contains no provision for sale of 
the property or for application of the proceeds 
to satisfying the interests of the parties. It 
merely calls for a relationship of tenants in 
common in the premises. A partition or other 
separation of interests is the subject matter of a 
different action. American Mut Bldg. & Loan 
Co. v. Jones, 102 Utah 318, 117 P.2d 293 (1941), 
rehearing denied, 102 Utah 328, 133 P2d 332 
(1943) 
Value of improvements. 
—Fair market value. 
Since this section requires that if the owner 
retains the property he shall "pay the ap-
praised value of the improvements," this was 
properly regarded by the trial court as being 
the fair market value in the usual understand-
ing of that term and not as including any 
special concealed value the property may have 
had. Alleman v. Miner, 10 Utah 2d 356,353 P.2d 
463 (1960). 
REFERENCES 
Need for an Adverse Possession Remedy, 1986 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 957. 
57-6-4. Certain persons considered to hold under color of 
title. 
(1) A purchaser in good faith at any judicial or tax sale made by the proper 
person or officer has color of title within the meaning of this chapter, whether 
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or not the person or officer has sufficient authority to sell, unless the want of 
authority was known to the purchaser at the time of the sale. 
(2) (a) Any person has color of title who has occupied a tract of real estate 
by himself, or by tho^e under whom he claims, for the term of five years, 
or who has occupied it for less time, if he, or those under whom he claims, 
have at any time during the occupancy with the knowledge or consent, 
express or implied, of the real owner made any valuable improvements on 
the real estate, or if he or those under whom he claims have at any time 
during the occupancy paid the ordinary county taxes on the real estate for 
any one year, and two years have elapsed without a repayment by the 
owner, and the occupancy is continued up to the time at which the action 
is brought by which the recovery of the real estate is obtained. 
(b) The person's rights shall pass to his assignees or representatives 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to give tenants color of title 
against their landlords or give any person a claim under color of title to school 
or institutional trust lands as defined in Subsection 53C-1-103(6) 
History: R.S, 1898 & C X . 1907, § 2024; merit, effective May 1, 1995, added the subsec-
C.L. 1917, § 5034; ILS. 1933 & C. 1943, 78- t ion designations, added the second clause in 
6-4; L. 1995, ch. 299, § 25. Subsection (3) beginning "or give any person," 
Amendment Notes . — The 1995 amend- and made related and stylistic changes 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
the land, encouraged them to do so, and in some 
cases consented to the impro\ements Jeffs v 
Stubbs , 970 P2d 1234 (Utah 1998), cert de 
med, 526 U S 1130, 119 S Ct 1S03 143 L Ed 
2d 1007 (1999) 
Basis of claimant's right. 
—Color of title. 
The claimants to land allegedly owned by a 
trust had color of title to their lots where the 
trust knew that the claimants were improving 
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JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge: 
"In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we accord no 
deference to the trial courtf s conclusions of law and review them 
for correctness." Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 
(Utah 1997). "[W]e view the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Hiaains v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 
1993) . 
Rogers first argues that the County is estopped from 
enforcing its subdivision ordinance. The elements of equitable 
estoppel are: "(1) an admission, statement or act inconsistent 
with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party 
on the faith of such admission, statement or act, and (3) injury 
to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act." State 
ex rel. Parker v. Irizarrv, 945 P.2d 676, 680 (Utah 1997). 
Specifically, Rogers asserts that the County's acceptance and 
recordation of contracts and a deed for the sale of portions of 
his acreage are acts inconsistent with the Countyfs current 
position. We disagree. A county recorder has no discretion and 
must record all instruments received. See Utah Code Ann. §17-
21-17(1) (1999). The recording of the relevant instruments is 
for notice purposes and is unrelated to the County's enforcement 
of zoning ordinances; it did not justify Rogers's inference that 
the County was allowing subdivision of his property without 
approval. Rogers also does not allege specific impending injury 
if the County is allowed to enforce its ordinances here. On both 
the first and third of the essential elements of equitable 
estoppel, then, Rogers's defense fails as a matter of law. 
Rogers next argues that the county waived its right to 
enforce its ordinances against him. We decline to consider this 
defense as it is not properly before us. For an issue to be 
preserved for appeal, the district court must be given the chance 
to consider it. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982). Because 
Rogersf s memorandum to the district court did not address the 
defense of waiver, Rogers failed to properly preserve this 
defense for appeal. 
Rogers also argues that his buyers are necessary parties 
within the meaning of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). A 
party is necessary if: 
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be 
accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject 
of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in his absence may 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede 
his ability to protect that interest or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties 
subject to a substantial risk of incurring 
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of his claimed 
interest. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). Rogers has not argued that subsection (1) 
applies and, under subsection (2), Rogers's buyers are not 
necessary parties. 
Though they likely may claim an interest, Rogers points to 
no particular circumstance under which the buyers' ability to 
protect their interests will be impaired or impeded by the 
disposition of this case in their absence. Likewise, Rogers does 
not specify how he would be subject to the risk of "double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations." Id. Because 
Rogers alleges no facts which would meet the requirements of Rule 
19, this argument also fails. 
Though Rogers next invokes the Occupying Claimant's Act (the 
Act), it is not apparent how it applies to this case. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 57-6-1 to -8 (1994 & Supp. 1999). Rogers's buyers 
are not threatened with the kind of action against their property 
that the Act's protections contemplate. The remedy sought by the 
990766-CA 2 
County seeks neither to expel them nor to encumber their property 
in any way. The Act thus does not apply here. 
Rogers also argues that the district court's grant of 
summary judgment was improper before discovery. Such decisions 
regarding discovery will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 
P.2d 1182, 1195 (Utah 1996). Despite his argument that discovery 
must generally precede summary judgment, a court need not allow 
discovery when "the motion opposing summary judgment is dilatory 
or without merit." Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 
275, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The district court judge 
apparently determined here that Rogers's opposition to the 
County's motion was without merit. Further, Rogers did not then 
and does not now offer any theories as to what material facts he 
might obtain through discovery. Discovery is not allowed when 
the party opposing the motion for summary judgment is "'merely on 
a "fishing expedition."'" Id. (citations omitted). We thus 
cannot say the district court abused its discretion in denying 
Rogers's motion for discovery. 
Affirmed. 
, ,/? 
Ndrman H. Jackson, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
RusseHT'WN Bench , J u d g e sn 
/ -z^L 
Jam£s Z. Davi s/vtTudge 
^ 
/ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
Grand County, 
Respondent, 
vs. No. 20000672-SC 
Lester W. Rogers, 990766-CA 
Petitioner. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 48, of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed on August 2, 2000, by 
petitioner is granted. 
FOR THE COURT: 
$c£i&t 2(?c® 
Date Richard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
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